When Arthur Laffer and other 'supply side advocates' plot total tax revenue as a function of a particular tax rate, they draw an upward-sloping segment called the normal range, followed by a downward-sloping segment called the prohibitive range. A brief literature review indicates that tax rates on the prohibitive range in theoretical and empirical models have been the result of particularly high tax rates, high elasticity parameters, or both. The labor tax rate which maximizes total revenue, for example, will depend on the assumed labor supply elasticity. This paper introduces a new curve which summarizes the tax rate and elasticity combinations that result in maximum revenues, separating the 'normal area' from the 'prohibitive area'. A generalpurpose empirical U.S. general equilibrium model is used to plot the Laffer curve for several elasticities, and to plot the newly introduced curve using the labor tax example. Results indicate that the U.S. could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive area, but that the tax wedge or labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher than most estimates would suggest.
Introduction
Ever since Arthur B. Laffer first drew his famous curve on a napkin in a Washington restaurant seven years ago, there has been considerable public debate about the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenue. Pictured in fig. 1 , the curve plots total revenue against the tax rate and claims to show that there are two rates at which a given revenue can be collected. The tax rate of fig. 1 generally refers to any particular tax instrument, while revenues generally refer to total tax receipts. An increase in the payroll tax rate, for example, could affect not only its own revenue, but work effort and thus personal income tax revenues. 
Fig. I
The upward-sloping portion of the curve is called the 'normal' range and the downward-sloping segment is the 'prohibitive' range. No rational government would knowingly operate on the latter range in the long run, because the same revenue could be obtained with a lower tax rate. However, with adjustment lags in the private sector and a high social discount rate, such tax rates might be used in the short run. The prohibitive range is said to exist because the high tax rates stifle economic activity, force agents to barter, and encourage leisure pursuits.
It is also made plausible by remembering that excess burden varies with the square of the tax rate. The debate has been conducted mostly in the spheres of politics and journalism, and it includes a wide variety of unsupported claims and opinions.
These range all the way from the assertion that the prohibitive range does not exist to the claim that 'we are well within this range at present'.' Simple theoretical models can show that the prohibitive range does indeed exist, but the U.S. position on the curve is clearly an empirical matter. Despite the obvious importance of this issue for fiscal policy, there has been no serious estimation of the curve using an economic model.' This paper attempts to correct this deficiency by using a general equilibrium taxation 'Michael Kin&y (1978) correctly claims that there is no logical necessity for revenues to be zero at 100 percent tax rales, due to nonmonetary incentives for work effort, but he incorrectly infers that 'there's no logical reason to assume without proof that the Laffer curve ever reverses direction at all ' (p. 38) . Laffer (1980) points out that even if a motivated person still works with a 100 percent tax rate, there must be some higher rate that will make him stop. The curve will still have the shape of lig. 1. The quote in the text is from Laffer (1977, p. 79) . 'Several papers have described models in which there exists the possibility of a prohibitive range. See Canto, Joines and LafTer (1978) and Beck (1979) for examples. Other empirical papers have found governments operating in this range. as seen in the next section. Also, Kiefer (1978) provides estimates of revenue effects from the DRI, Wharton, and Chase Econometric models. None of these papers plots out the Laffer curve, however, nor do they estimate its relationship to various elasticity parameters. model to address two questions. First, what is the position of the U.S. on the curve today? Second, what is the relationship between the location of the curve itself and critical parameters like the appropriate factor supply elasticity?3
The next section offers a brief review of some salient points from the debate. A common aspect of previous studies is that a prohibitive range for some local or national economy is always associated with particularly high tax rates, high factor supply elasticities, or both. Section 3 sets out the conditions under which a lower tax rate could result in higher revenues. These conditions are summarized in a new curve, plotting the appropriate factor supply elasticity against the tax rate. Section 4 describes the general equilibrium model used to simulate the effects of various tax rates. These estimations are performed in section 5, and the two curves are plotted for an example with a labor tax and labor supply elasticity. Section 6 provides some evidence on the value of the critical labor supply elasticity, and the final section concludes that to operate in the prohibitive range, the tax wedge must be very high, or the factor supply elasticity must be very high, or there must be some combination of the two.
A brief literature review
The idea of an inverse relationship between tax rates and revenue is not entirely new. In The We&h of Nations (1776) with correcting market failure by providing a public good. Third, they fail to allow for any complementarity between private and public outputs. Clearly there are public goods such as police protection and transportation systems which act to encourage private production, more than offsetting the adverse effects of the necessary tax wedge. Thus, the 'balanced budget' labor supply curve does not have to be upward sloping as these authors insist. Positive and negative estimates for the aggregate uncompensated labor supply elasticity will be surveyed in a later section."
In empirical work, Grieson et al. (1977) find the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and revenue for local government in New York: 'The inclusion of state taxes lost when economic activity leaves both the city and state would . . . raise the possibility of a net revenue loss as a result of an increase in business income taxes' (p. 179). They find that the nonmanufacturing sector has fewer alternatives to the New York City location and should be taxed more heavily relative to the manufacturing sector whose response to tax is more elastic. Grieson (1980) fig. 1 depends on the supply elasticity of the factor being taxed. If that elasticity were fairly low, the total revenue maximizing point would be at a high tax rate for that factor, and conversely. One can imagine a third dimension on that diagram giving different elasticity values. The hill would then be converted into a ridge, running from a low tax rate and high elasticity combination to a high rate and low elasticity pair. The crest of that ridge is plotted in fig. 2 . Everything to the southwest of that curve signifies the 'normal area', where raising rates increases revenue, and northeast of the curve is the 'prohibitive area', where no rational government would 'Three points serve to mitigate the strength of this result. First, a capital gains tax cut might unlock a flood of realizations in the short run, without necessarily increasing revenues in the long run. Second, increased selling of corporate stock does not necessarily imply increased savmg and capital formation (i.e. buying of corporate stock). Third, the capital gains tax cut is likely to increase corporate retained earnings, decrease the dividends paid out, and thus reduce personal tax revenue from dividends.
'Other themes from this literature include minimum wage laws, regulation of business, nonmarket activity, and the complexity of tax rules. The Laffer curve itself focuses on tax rates, however, so this paper will consider different tax rates and assume unchanged complexity. The relevant elasticity fGr this exercise would provide not just the response of labor supply, but the response of taxable labor supply. Each point on the curve shows the tax rate which maximizes total revenue for a given elasticity.
Suppose, for a simple example, that homogeneous labor L is taxed at the proportional rate t. Labor demand and supply are based, respectively, on the gross-of-tax wage w and the net-of-tax wage ~(1 -t), in constant elasticity forms:
L, = B[w( 1 -t)]", &>O. (2)
Tax revenue R is equal to twL, so differentiation and algebra provide:
Setting (3) equal to zero, we have three equations that can be solved for w, L, and the revenue-maximizing tax rate t. Since L,=L, in this partial equilibrium system, we can use (1) and (2) to express w as a function of t. Substituting that w back into (l), we can also express L as a function of t. Differentiating these expressions, substituting into (3) and solving for t, we have:9
If q> -1 (demand is inelastic), then higher tax rates can always achieve 'Eq. (4) 
so the curve slopes down and is convex to the origin. The easiest case to see is where q = -co, so that t= l/( 1 +c). Then the revenue maximizing rate approaches one as F goes to zero, and it approaches zero as E becomes infinite.'e
We can now reconcile conflicting claims of the previous section. Those who find an inverse relationship between tax rates and revenues must believe that the relevant elasticity is high, that the relevant tax rate is high, or both. Those who find a normal range must believe that one or both of these parameters is low. Finally, those who deny the existence of an inverse relationship at any tax rate might really just believe that the uncompensated supply elasticity is zero or negative (or that demand is inelastic)."
The general equilibrium model
To simulate the effects of different tax rates for a variety of factor supply elasticities, a previously developed general equilibrium taxation model is employed.
This model has been used to evaluate various tax reform proposals, but it was built as a general purpose model. Its features are surprisingly well suited for this application, as no adjustments were required to obtain the following estimates. Since more thorough descriptions of the model are available elsewhere, only an essential outline of it is provided here.12 "'Several points are manifest. First, this analysis oversimplifies by using a given elasticity for all tax rates to find the revenue maximizing point. As the tax rate varies, so would equilibrium prices, incomes, and preference parameters like the factor supply elasticity. Second, a given time frame is implied smce elasticities might increase as more time is allowed for adjustment.
Third, neither elasticities nor tax rates have to he positive. The southwest quadrant contains a symmetrical curve showing the maximum revenue loss from a subsidy. Finally. note that similar analyses can he performed with respect to q, the labor demand elasticity.
"A zero uncompensated elasticity can mask a high compensated elasticity, however. Hausman (1981) points out that while the former is relevant to determine actual factor supply (and thus the tax base and revenues), the latter is relevant for the efficiency cost of distortions.
"See Fullerton, Shoven and Whalley (1978) and Fullerton, King, Shoven and Whalley (1981 Each consumer has initial endowments of labor and capital services which can be sold for use in production.
Because of perfect mobility and competition, the net-of-tax return to each factor is equal among industries. A consumer can also choose to buy some of his own labor endowment for leisure. The capital stock is fixed in any one period, but the dynamic version of the model allows the savings response to augment the stock in later periods. Demand functions are based on CES utility functions with double nesting. The choice between present and future consumption is represented by the outside nest, and the elasticity of substitution between them is based on an estimate of the uncompensated savings elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return. For this value we use 0.4 as found by Boskin (1978) . The breakdown of present consumption into commodities and leisure is represented by the inside nest, and the elasticity of substitution in this choice is based on an estimate of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax wage. For this value we typically use 0.15, but relationships for different labor elasticity values will be derived below.' 3 The various federal, state, and local taxes are typically modelled as ad valorem tax rates on purchases of appropriate products or factors. Corporate income taxes and property taxes are modelled as different effective rates of tax on use of capital by industry.r4
Social security, workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance appear as taxes on use of labor. These rates differ slightly by industry because different proportions of workers hit the social security maximum, but they average 10 percent of payments to labor. Personal income taxes operate as different linear schedules for each consumer group, with marginal tax rates increasing from an average of 1 percent for '3Leisure in the baseline is taken as three-fourths of observed labor, retlecting the assumption that 40 hours are worked out of a possible 70 hours each week. Because of the CES form, the income elasticity of demand for leisure is one. From the Slutsky equation, it can then be shown that the compensated labor supply elasticity is equal to the uncompensated elasticity plus 3/7. A tax increase alone will cause a reaction based on the uncompensated elasticity, but if revenues are returned to consumers then their net behavior will approximate the larger compensated response.
14The effective tax rate in each industry is equal to capital taxes paid divided by capital income. For a comparison of this 'average' tax rate with an alternative 'marginal' treatment in this model, see Fullerton and Gordon (1982 and number of dependents which make the recipient unable to work. If this intention is successful, the payments will not have a substitution effect. The income effect of transfer programs could also reduce labor supply, but this effect is captured in the model.15 "The difference between paying people who do not work, and paying people not to work, is the difference between a marginal payment with incentive effects, and a lump-sum payment. Legally, an employee must be laid off to be eligible for unemployment compensation.
A worker can ask to be laid off but employers may he reluctant to circumvent the intent of the law. These transfers are not automatically and fully available to nonworkers. Similarly, AFDC payments are designed to select recipients by particular characteristics, maximizing the lump-sum effect and minimizing disincentive effects. Social security payments are higher for the blind or disabled. Finally, note that these transfers, to the extent that they are disincentives, do not always apply to marginal hours. Most individuals who take an extra hour of leisure do not become eligible for transfers at all. Laffer (1980) is correct, however, that if transfer payments include a means test, work disincentives can be large for some individuals. Another more thorough study could undertake to measure incentive effects of transfers.
Estimation
Supply side advocates refer to several different types of taxes when they claim an inverse relationship betwen a particular tax rate and government revenue. The curve in fig. 2 could be plotted by varying a product tax rate against the price elasticity of demand for that product, or by plotting capital tax rates against the elasticity of savings with respect to the net-of-tax return to capital. The latter example was attempted with the empirical model, but no prohibitive area was discovered." For this reason, the example used here is the labor tax against the labor supply elasticity.
In our basic model, the tax on labor used by industry averages 10 percent of net factor payments. The personal income tax takes another 24.9 percent of marginal labor income, weighting the twelve marginal tax rates by labor income of each group. The total wedge thus takes 31.8 percent of marginal labor income gross of all tax. " This overall marginal rate is the relevant single parameter for summarizing incentive effects in the model, and this is the parameter varied in simulations for the horizontal axes of figs. 1 and 2. The overall average rate is 19.2 percent, dividing total labor taxes by gross labor income.
Marginal tax rates determine incentives, but average tax rates by definition determine revenues. A more progressive tax structure will therefore attain an earlier revenue maximum.
For this reason, progressivity should not be altered in simulating alternative tax rates. Unfortunately, however, there is no unambiguous measure of progressivity. Simulations in this paper will hold constant the first of three possible progressivity measures defined in Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) . The effect of this selection is that the same number of percentage points are added to or subtracted from all average and marginal labor tax rates of all consumers when a rate change is simulated. Such changes are summarized by referring to changes in the 31.8 percent "Over forty simulations were performed in seeking a prohibitive area for capital taxes. Using the dynamic version of the model, tax rates were raised to 83 percent of gross capital income, savings elasticities were increased to 4.0, and equilibria were calculated out 50 years in the future. Normally, discount rate problems arise in determining whether the present value of revenues has increased or decreased. In this case, however, there was not a single period of the raised-tax sequence of equilibria which had lower revenues than the corresponding period of the benchmark sequence. Inverse relationships may exist for high effective rates of tax on certain types of real capital income for certain individuals. No overall inverse relationship was discovered in this model, however, because the tax distortion applies to the savings decision, while savings are only an increment to the capital tax base. More than 50 years would be required for the tax base reduction to offset a tax rate increase and result in lower revenues.
"The model detines labor income as net of the 10 percent factor tax on industries, but gross of the personal income tax on individuals.
For a marginal dollar of this labor income, $1.10 is the gross-of-tax payment, $0.10 is the payroll tax, and $0.249 is the marginal personal tax paid, averaged over the 12 groups. The total marginal tax rate is thus (0.1+0.249)/1.10, which equals 31.8 percent, except for rounding.
By the same formula for different groups, personal marginal rates between I and 40 percent imply total marginal rates between (0.1 +0.01)/1.10, which equals 10 percent, and (0.1 +0.4)/1.10, which equals 45.5 percent.
overall marginal rate on gross labor income." The consistent 1973 data set also shows a total tax revenue of $360 billion and a national income of $1,252 billion. Our expanded notion of welfare, including leisure valued at the net-of-tax wage, is $1,690 billion, These values are replicated for any possible labor supply elasticity as long as tax rates arc unchanged.
Simulations with labor tax rates other than 31.8 percent will have revenues which depend on the elasticity, and it becomes necessary to specify the disposition of extra revenues. One possibility is simply to allow a budget surplus or deficit. If a surplus implies lower future taxes, however, individuals may react to an effective tax rate that is different from the specified rate for the simulation.
Higher revenues must eventually be spent or returned (see footnote 5). A second possibility is to increase public expenditure on the 19 industry outputs of the model. Though government spending has no macroeconomic effects on inflation or unemployment in this model, it does have a microeconomic effect on the pattern of demands for commodities.
It indirectly affects the demand for capital and labor through the different factor ratios of production.
Instead, additonal revenues are returned to consumers in lump-sum fashion, in proportion to their original after-tax incomes.' 9
The results from over sixty simulations are summarized in table 1 .20 The first column shows the total revenue resulting from different labor tax rates using the basic model's value of 0.15 for the labor supply elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax wage. The 'observed' total revenue of $360 billion corresponds to the basic tax rate of 31.8 percent, and total revenues are positively related to tax rates up to a tax which is 78.8 percent of gross labor income. Beyond that rate, revenues start to fall.2' '"Thus. labor tax rate changes can be thought of as changes m the proportional payroll tax rate or as changes in all average and marginal personal tax rates, on labor income only.
'"This lump-sum rebate has no direct effect on prices since no tax rates are altered. It could have an indirect effect on prices of the simulated equilibrium, however, since consumers include the income in their expanded budgets for purchase of commodities and leisure according to their own preference patterns. This disposition of revenues corresponds exactly to that of Canto, Joines and Laffer (1978) reviewed in section 2. By symmetry, a decrease in revenue is accompanied by a lump-sum charge on consumers in the same proportions. Total government tax revenues are defined to be inclusive of income returned to consumers, and exclusive of any lump-sum charges necessary to keep government spending on commodities constant. *"These simulations are static in the sense that total endowments of labor and capital are fixed. Labor can be sold to industry or retained for leisure in the simulation, while both factors can be rea!located among industries.
"Like Canto, Joines and Laffer (1978) , this model ignores production-encouraging aspects of any public goods made possible through increased revenue. As a result, national income (GNP) Falls by S292 billion when the elasticity is 0.15 and the tax rate is raised to 78.8 percent. Though the return to the fixed capital stock rises, labor supply falls off by almost half. The gross-of-tax wage rises, but the net-of-tax wage falls by 40 percent in the new equilibrium.
If the incrcaucd leisure is valued at the net-of-tax wage, then the 8292 billion income fall is offset by a $177 billion leisure gain, with a $1 I5 billion net loss in real terms. These calculations use a Laspeyres Index. valumg old and new quantities at base prices. "Simulations were made selectively to save computational expense. Not all possible rates are reported. These rates on gross income include social security taxes and persona1 income taxes at the overall marginal rate, all as a fraction of gross labor income.
Any column of data from table 1 can be used to plot an example of fig. 1 , as is done in fig. 3 for the 0.15 elasticity.
In any of these Laffer curve diagrams, the modelled U.S. economy is represented by 0.318 on the labor tax rate axis. If the various tax rates, transfers, and elasticities are reasonable, as modelled, then the U.S. economy is well down the normal range of the curve. For those who prefer a high elasticity, fg. 4 plots another Laffer curve. Underlined in each column of table 1 is the maximum revenue point for that elasticity.
These tax rate and elasticity combinations correspond to points on a curve like fig. 2 . When plotted for this example, the curve is shown in fig. 5 . On this curve, with tax rates as modelled, the labor supply elasticity would have to be at least 2.5 to put the U.S. over the peak and onto the prohibitive range. Alternativelv, if the supply elasticity were at least 1.0 and the true overall tax rate were at least 48.2 percent, then again U.S. taxes could be operating irrationally. The continuum of fig. 5 allows the reader to select a plausible tax rate and elasticity combination to determine whether the U.S. is now in the prohibitive area.
What is the labor supply elasticity?
The empirical model was fairly careful in establishing all of the basic tax "In the 4.0 -1asticitv case, even the small jump from a 31.8 percent labor tax rate to a 34.7 percent rate causes a 9 percent fall in labor supply, a $70 billion reduction in national income, a $44 billion increase in the value of leisure, and a net welfare loss of $26 billion in real terms. A small tax cut with this high elasticity results in symmetrical increases in labor supply, output, and welfare. All tax cuts increase welfare in this model because revenue is replaced with lumpsum charges as in Canto, Joines and Laffer (1978) . Such opportunitie< may not in fact bc available. Boskin's (1973) division by sex, race, and age found estimates from -0.07 (for primeage white males) to + 1.60 (for elderly black women). Since taxes do not distinguish among these characteristics, the relevant elasticity parameter is an aggregate one. Table 2 summarizes a number of econometric studies and is based mostly on discussion in Killingsworth (1982) . A certain injustice is perpetrated against these authors by reporting their results in such summary fashion. Each study has its own measure of the wage, its own data-year or time-period, its own mean values, and its own functional forms. The studies differ as to whether they account for labor participation rates and as to whether they account for the balanced budget effects of government spending, discussed above.23 The numbers in table 2 are provided only to give the reader a framework for choosing a plausible aggregate labor supply elasticity. Since few aggregate studies are available, male and female estimates can be roughly combined.
Elasticity estimates for males are mostly small and negative, ranging from -0.40 to zero. Borjas and Heckman (1978) shows that the median money income of male employed civilians has consistently been twice that of females. It also shows about a 1.7 ratio of males to females in the labor force, a ratio which is decreasing with time. By multiplication, the ratio of total male to female labor income would be about 3.4 (though decreasing). Taking a relatively high male elasticity of -0.10 and a relatively high female elasticity of +0.90, the three-to-one weighted average is a 0.15 aggregate elasticity.
Conclusion
This paper investigates a number of analytical and empirical arguments '"The most recent and perhaps the most thorough estimates are provided in Hausman (1981) . His methodology includes consideration of progressivity, transfer programs, labor force participation, fixed costs of working, and a market wage which depends on the hours worked. These features can result in budget sets that are nonconvex and labor supply that is discontinuous.
However, the study stall excludes choices wtth respect to the type of job, the intensity of work on the job, nonpecuniary rewards, on the job training, and intertemporal considerations.
about the relationship between tax rates and government revenues. A general equilibrium tax model is used to plot this relationship as well as another relationship between tax rates and factor supply elasticities. This new curve shows that the U.S. economy could conceivably be operating in the 'prohibitive range' for taxes on labor, but that reasonable estimates of an aggregate labor supply elasticity and of an overall marginal labor tax rate are both low enough to suggest that broad-based cuts in labor tax rates would not increase revenues.
The tax rate and elasticity relationship can be applied to other federal, state, or local taxes to find circumstances where a particularly high tax rate on real income or a particularly high elasticity could place a tax in the prohibitive area. A tax on purely nominal capital gains, for example, or an underallowance for depreciation can result in high effective tax rates on some types of real capital income. Future research could investigate the responsiveness of these particular investments to high effective rates. The 'marriage penalty' which places a secondary worker in the higher marginal tax bracket of his or her spouse may represent another high rate of tax on an elastically supplied factor.24 Welfare programs that make recipients ineligible at a given income level imply effective marginal tax rates of 100 percent or higher. Also, the high elasticity argument is particularly applicable for state and local governments since factors are generally more mobile within national boundaries. McGuire and Rapping (1968, 1970) find labor supply elasticities of 2&100 tbr particular states or industries. This mobility implies that one jurisdiction cannot charge higher tax rates than its neighbors and may apply increasingly to international factor flows. Finally, although the results of this paper tend to reject the notion of an inverse relationship between major U.S. tax rates and government revenues, they do not necessarily invalidate the claim that these tax rates and revenues should be lowered. Even on the normal range, taxes may be higher than desired by voters. Preferences can change over time, fewer public goods may now be demanded, and the electorate can legitimately request a tax decrease. Although incentive effects can still be important without perverse revenue effects, the point is that the 'economics of the tax revolt' are less the economics of incentive effects and more the economics of public choice. Z4Feenberg and Rosen (1982) simulate the effects of four proposals to reduce or eliminate the marriage penalty. Each has its own welfare effects and redistributions, but ncme implies higher revenue.
